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1 INTRODUCTION 
For the first time in South Africa's industrial relations history, European 
style co-determination has been introduced into our labour legislation 
through the introduction of workplace forums in Chapter 5 of the new 
Labour Relations Act (LRA). The rationale for introducing a system of 
workplace representation is stated clearly in the explanatory memoran-
dum of the Legal Task Team set up in 1994 to review the labour relations 
system. 
"South Africa's re-entry into international markets and the imperatives of a 
more open economy demand that we produce value-added products and im-
prove productivity levels. To achieve this, major restructuring is required. In 
those countries, such as the United Kingdom, where the adversariallabour re-
lations system was not supplemented by workplace-based institutions for 
worker representation and labour Imanagement communication "a second 
channel" of industrial relations - this process fared badly. Workplace restruc-
turing has been most successful in those countries where participatory struc-
tures exist: for example. Japan, Germany and Sweden. If we are to have any 
hope of successfully restructuring our industries and economy. then manage-
ment and labour must find new ways of dealing with each other" (Ministry of 
Labour: 35). 
The Legal Task Team argued that the old system of industrial relations, 
designed in the 1 920s, was not suitable for this task. The new Act provides 
for workplace forums to be established by the Commission for Concilia-
tion, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) on application by a representative 
union. This is designed to reassure unions that forums will not be used, as 
works and liaison committees were used in the past, to supplant unions. 
Instead, they are designed to compel employers to co-operate by provid-
ing workers with statutory rights of consultation and jOint decision-making 
in the workplace. Specifically: 
I The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Tanya Rosenthal in research-










































LAW,DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT· 
"they are designed to perform functions that collective bargaining cannot easily 
achieve: the joint solution of problems and the resolution of conflicts over pro-
duction. Their purpose is not to undermine collective bargaining but to sup-
plement it" (ibid). 
In the light of the new form of participation offered by workplace forums, 
the aim of this article is to identify the changing forms of workplace 
representation that have been emerging in South Africa. The article does 
this by reviewing recent survey evidence of the extent to which new 
forms of workplace representation have been emerging. The bulk of the 
article is devoted to presenting the findings of a number of preliminary 
case studies of selected companies where new forms of workplace repre-
sentation were introduced prior to the new legislation. In our interviews 
we explored how these forums! were established, how they function and 
what their main characteristics are. 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Two clarificatory conceptual points are necessary before proceeding. 
Firstly, the existing forms of worker participation in South Africa have not 
constituted a legally supported system, as in a number of European coun-
tries. In Germany, for instance, one finds a union movement that has had 
"(a) consuming preoccupation with Mitbestimmung: the equal sharing of 
control over economic decisions between capital and labour at all levels. 
including the enterprise"(Streeck in Rogers & Streeck: 319). Underlying 
this system is a different theory of the firm. Firms are public institutions. 
not just the property of their shareholders. and are required to take ac-
count of the interests of employees. Thus the Jaw provides for representa-
tion at workplace level (through works councils) and representation at 
enterprise level (through a worker representative on the management 
board and equal representation of employees and shareholders on super-
visory boards in enterprises with more than two thousand employees). 
This strong political and legislative support for co-determination has 
ensured that it has become the cornerstone of the industrial relations 
system. 
Under this system managers of large firms face capital and labour mar-
kets that are highly organised, enabling both capital and labour to partici-
pate directly in the everyday operation of the firm and requiring decisions 
to be continuously negotiated. Decisions thus take longer. but are also 
easier to implement. Furthermore. by giving the workforce a legal right to 
co-decision making it becomes more difficult to dismiss workers. The 
result is that the average employment spell in a German firm (I 0.4 years) 
is almost as long as Japan (l0.9) and much longer than the United States 
2 The term "forum" emerged in the early 1990s to describe a wide range of representa-
tive institutions that were established to give voice to the disenfranchised. such as the 
National Economic Forum. the Housing Forums and a wide variety of forums in the 
workplace. The term workplace forum was drawn from these examples and used in 











































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION?· 
(6.7) (Streeck: Table 5). Importantly, by turning labour into more of a 
fixed cost, high investment in skills is encouraged. To understand co-
determination then, it is necessary to understand that a different kind of 
capitalism emerged in Germany after the second World War, what Michel 
Albert calls the Rhine model, as distinct from the American model 
(Albert, 1992). 
In South Africa the opposite is the case. Workplace representation 
evolved in an adversarial fashion, with black workers and their represen-
tatives maintaining a strategic distance from areas of responsibility and 
decision-making. An important part of the reason for this orientation has 
been the historically hostile stance of the state towards unions, particularly 
black trade unions. Thus, South African legislation until 1995 repeatedly 
tried to introduce mechanisms for employee representation that were 
intended to supplant trade unionism. The first instance of such legislation 
was the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 which pro-
vided for the establishment of works committees to represent black 
workers. These structures were limited to an essentially advisory role vis-
a-vis management, and were meant to supplant unions for black workers. 
This Act was amended in 1973 to provide for the establishment of liaison 
committees where works committees did not exist. The new version of 
the Act, called the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act, constituted the 
liaison committees as consultative bodies, composed of equal numbers of 
management and worker representatives and, as in terms of the 1953 
Act, to be chaired by an appointee of the employer. 
Both the works and liaison committees discredited workplace represen-
tation in the eyes of trade unionists, although works committees were 
used strategically by certain unions and in certain areas due to the fact 
that these bodies could be constituted through worker election of repre-
sentatives. The Wiehahn Commission revisited these mechanisms and 
from the Commission flowed major changes to the Industrial Conciiia[ion 
Act, later renamed the Labour Relations Act. the most important feature of 
which was the recognition of black trade unions. But the Commission also 
recommended the retention of a weak form of workplace representation, 
in the form of works councils which were to replace the works and liaison 
committees. In practice, very few works councils were established. Bendix 
reported that "the experience is that works councils are soon overtaken by 
trade unions and, even where this does not happen, conflict arises be-
tween the plant-level union and the works committee/council" (Bendix, 
1991: 428). 
In contrast to state and management initiated workplace representation 
and employee involvement, shop steward committees emerged in the 
1980s as the central communication channel between workers and man-
agement on the shop floor. Shop steward committees perform a dual 
function; they engage in collective bargaining, and participate in joint 
problem-solving where problems arise in production. Thus, unlike Ger-
many where the works councils are institutionally separated from collec-
tive bargaining which takes place at industry level. in South Africa a form 
of union-linked workplace representation emerged that engages in both 










































· LAW, DEMOGRACY&DEVELOPMENT 
However, during the early 1990s, a number of companies began to 
separate these two functions institutionally by establishing jOint forums 
with unions. within which information sharing. consultation and. in some 
cases. jOint decision-making occurs. These innovative structures formed a 
point of departure for the Legal Task Team's recommendations that work-
place forums be introduced. In exploring these structures the Legal Task 
Team also drew on the legislation governing the German works council 
system. 
The second conceptual point relates to the distinction between work-
place representation and employee involvement. Employee involvement 
is a much broader phenomenon than that of workplace representation 
and incorporates a variety of schemes aimed at enhancing quality. pro-
ductivity and motivation amongst the workforce. It is a form of direct 
involvement in the immediate work environment and constitutes an 
example of what Pateman calls "pseudo participation", or techniques 
which persuade employees to accept decisions that have already been 
made by management (Pateman, 1971). 
Workplace representation, on the other hand. involves formal mecha-
nisms of management-worker interaction that seek to "institutionalise 
rights of collective worker participation. including rights to information 
and consultation on the organisation of production and, in some cases, 
formal co-determination in decision-making" (Rogers & Streeck: 98). In 
the South African context. co-determination can be taken to refer to joint 
decision-making, where decisions can be made only if they are agreed to 
by both parties. Co-determination as a form of decision-making can be 
usefully distinguished from consultation, which involves obligations, usually 
from management, to inform workers before taking a decision. to wait for 
a response or counterproposal. and to take any response or counterpro-
posal into consideration when deciding the issue (ibid: 149-150). 
Workplace representation, then, takes place through structured interac-
tion between management and workers. Such interaction may, however, 
vary in the form it takes, the frequency of interaction, the powers ascribed 
to representative institutions and may combine consultative and represen-
tative functions (Rogers and Streeck: 1 I). 
3 FROM EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT TO WORKPLACE 
REPRESENT A TI ON? 
Instead of workplace representation, management in the 1980s began 
introducing forms of employee involvement, such as briefing groups, com-
munication schemes. quality circles, "green areas", and suggestion schemes. 
Almost all of these structures were limited to the immediate work envi-
ronment and concentrated on increasing productivity (Maller, 1992). 
These findings have been confirmed in more recent research. 
Firstly, in both rounds of the South African Labour Flexibility Survey 
(SALFS) conducted in over 300 establishments in the manufacturing sector 
during 1995-1996, over 50 % of establishments reported having joint com-










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
1995 and 1996 (Macun. 1997: 5). The SALFS sample was weighted to 
include a larger number of smaller firms (employing between 1 and 50 
persons) and it is interesting to note that roughly 46 % of firms which 
reported having jOint committees were in this small size grouping. A 
postal survey conducted in 1992 and 1995 also found a significant num-
ber of companies embarking on employee involvement initiatives (Velds-
man & Harilall. 1996). Interestingly. Veldsman and Harilall found that in 
1995 most companies (91 %) had initiated employee involvement to 
prepare for future environmental changes and to make it easier to intro-
duce changes in the functioning of their organisations. This contrasted 
with their 1992 finding where most organisations had cited improvement 
in quality, productivity and worker motivation as the main reasons for 
initiating employee involvement (ibid: 11). A worker representative sur-
vey. carried out as part of the SALFS, found a much smaller proportion of 
companies with mechanisms for management-employee discussions (apart 
From committees that dealt with negotiations or single topics such as 
health and safety) (17 %) (Macun, Rosenthal & Standing. 1997). Given the 
likelihood of divergent views on the nature of employee involvement 
between workers and senior managers, this is hardly surprising. This con-
flicting finding merely serves to emphasise the ambiguity surrounding ex-
pectations and the role of such initiatives. 
Secondly. the most common function of the jOint committees identified 
in the SALFS survey was consultation. Some were also concerned with 
negotiation. information-sharing and. in some cases. jOint decision-mak-
ing. but these were all a smaller proportion than those concerned with 
consultation. The survey by Veldsman and Harilall also found that a 
relatively small proportion of employees were actually involved in these 
initiatives and that they were predominantly production oriented; for ex-
ample. feedback mechanisms, quality circles and quality of work life com-
mittees (op cit: 69). 
Thirdly, despire an increase in these structures, the information flow 
between management and workers remains limited. Respondents to the 
SALFS were asked whether they provide information to employees or 
their representatives concerning work accidents. labour productivity. 
labour costs, sales and financial information on a regular basis. Apart from 
information pertaining to work accidents (which is subject to the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act), a relatively small proportion of firms pro-
vided information on key economic issues (see Table 1). This feature was 
confirmed both by the Veldsman and Harilall survey and the Worker 
Representative survey. 
Table 1: Percent of management providing information on selected issues to 
employees on a regular basis, t 996 
Category of information All Employees Representatives No information 
Work accidents 47 28 25 
Labour productivity .39 28 .3.3 
Labour costs 18 29 5.3 
Sales 26 24 50 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Finally, although it is difficult to gauge the extent of union involvement in 
these initiatives from the survey findings, it is clear that employee in-
volvement is occurring mainly in un ionised firms. Roughly 60 % of the 33 
companies surveyed by Veldsman and Harilall were unionised and this 
figure was very similar to the SALFS (58.7 %). It is possible [Q interpret this 
feature to suggest that management use employee involvement [Q bypass 
and. possibly, to undermine trade unions. Given the extensive support for 
COSATU unions, in particular, and their majority status in most work-
places, the undermining of unions is unlikely. It is more likely that trade 
unions treat such initiatives with circumspection, avoid them or find it 
necessary to engage with them in order to improve their participation 
rights in companies. 
4 CASE STUDIES OF WORKER REPRESENTATION 
4.1 Sample and method 
The companies selected for the study were chosen according to two 
factors; companies with whom the Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP) had 
past research contact and where the existence of institutions for worker 
participation was known. A more detailed summary of the sample is pre-
sented in Appendix 1. Our sample consisted of 1 1 large national compa-
nies: 6 in the manufacturing sector, 2 in mining, 2 parastatals (one elec-
tricity, one transport) and one in the retail sector. Interviews were con-
ducted with a representative from the industrial relations or human re-
sources department in each of the companies. The first round of inter-
views was conducted between February and March 1 995, with a second 
round of interviews being carried out between September and October 
1996.3 Where possible, union officials and shop stewards were also inter-
viewed. A semi-structured questionnaire was used and the interviews 
were transcribed. All the companies in the sample were highly unionised, 
with union membership exceeding 50 % of the workforce and the majority 
of companies having a unionisation rate of 80 % (see Appendix 2 for 
industrial relations features of the sample). 
As Appendix 1 indicates, nearly all of the companies are in highly com-
petitive markets. including, in many cases, competitive international mar-
kets. These are markets which are also price sensitive. A number of the 
companies are large enough to derive economies of scale and competitive 
advantage given their position as national companies. All the companies 
in the sample have undergone or are undergoing some form of restructur-
ing, ranging from changes in senior management to international expan-
sion. workplace restructuring and changing corporate culture. 
4.2 Findings 
The findings from our case studies can be divided into four different 
themes: why are forums introduced, what form do they take, what powers 










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
do they have, and how do they deal with conflict. After addressing these 
themes, we discuss some general observations before drawing con-
clusions. 
4.2.1 Why arejarums established? 
A variety of factors influenced the establishment of new forums. The most 
useful way of understanding these influences is through the concept of 
"breakpoints". "Breakpoints". according to Paul Strebel, are sudden radi-
cal changes in business conditions. changing technologies, changing com-
munity and customer attitudes and shifting political frontiers (Strebel. 
cited in Stace and Dunphy. 1994: 20). They can be handled. he says. by 
anticipating the breakpoints, by exploiting the breakpoints or by creating 
the breakpoints. 
All the companies interviewed began to anticipate "breakpoints" from 
the mid-! 980s onwards when they began introducing new participatory 
styles of management. However, two of these - VOlkswagen (VWSA) and 
PG Bison - stand out as organisations which created the breakpoints by 
developing "new rules of the game". By responding creatively to "break-
points" these companies changed the playing field for others. "Break-
points" force management to make strategic choices. Do they retain a 
hard line towards employees or do they seek a solution together? The 
latter approach is encouraged by the threat of chaos in a continued stale-
mate. The table below lists strikes. as the most dramatic example of 
breakpoints. 
Table 2: Strikes as breakpoints 
Company Date Duration Demands 
Pick 'n Pay July 1994 27 days R229 over I 2 months 
Eskom June 1994 1 day End to unilateral change 
Nampak August 1990 9 weeks Company bargaining 
Transnet November 1989 8 weeks Recognition agreement 
VWSA August 1994 6 weeks Sector bargaining (NBF) 
Mercedes Benz August 1994 6 weeks Sector bargaining (NBF) 
The Nampak Human Resource Director reflected on the nine week strike 
in the company during 1990, "You reach a stalemate. and then sit down 
afterwards. both formally and informally in various mediating sessions 
and so on. The blunt reality is: no one won that strike. There were no 
major achievements by either side" (Interview: 26 January 1995). 
It is quite often out of prolonged conflict. for example the VWSA strike 
in 1994. that the parties came to agree on the need to accept joint re-
sponsibility for the future of the company. The Human Resource Director 
(Nampak) expressed this point in these words, "The strike cleared the air 
and made us realise that we cannot carryon like this and destroy each 
other. I think if we had not had that strike it probably would have been 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEV)::LOPMENT 
The opening up of the South African economy in 1990 was to provide 
another "breakpOint". In the words of the Human Resources Director of 
VWSA: 
"Suddenly when the whole situation changed. everyone started saying we have 
got this plant down in South Africa. they have been bumbling along on their 
own. how do we integrate them into the Group? .. We had a new set of top 
management. who became much more productivity oriented. and would 
clearly say there is no such thing any more as a national car market. there is 
just one global car market. It happens to have a surplus production capacity of 
10 million cars. So suddenly we had this massive focus on our productivity, our 
Integration in the world: we had guys coming and going and saying, look, you 
guys are over-structured, you are not productive. a German plant producing the 
same number of cars as you has 2000 people, you have got 7000. What the 
hell are you doing?" (HR Director. VWSA, 15 February 1995). 
The result was a new agreement between VWSA and NUMSA "forged in 
the context of a recognition by the parties of the need to ensure the long-
term viability of VWSA in domestic and foreign markets". The agreement 
noted the global over capacity of motor vehicles of 10 million units, and 
the ongOing eight year tariff reduction programme for the South African 
motor vehicle industry, as well as the increased competition from both 
domestic and foreign manufacturers that this will engender. and commit-
ted the parties to "forge new standards which match those of our world-
class competitors" (ibid). As management explained. a forum was also 
necessary because "we had a vacuum - we had the national bargaining 
forum. but no regular in-plant negotiations. No place where we could 
trade off issues and we wanted a formal in-house committee to do this" 
(Interview: HR Director, VWSA. 3 October 1996). 
The initiation of workplace representation, at least by companies engag-
ing in strategic re-orientation. dovetails with devolution of managerial 
authority to lower level management. The industrial relations manager no 
longer has sole responsibility for stable and peaceful labour relations. 
Furthermore, industrial relations is no longer confined to collective bar-
gaining but is integrated into human resources management. corporate 
strategy and even production issues. 
As the Human Resources Director at Volkswagen observed: 
"I remember the old days when I first started in the industry - employee rela-
tions or industrial relations was the preserve of a couple of personnel types. I 
started at Ford and Fred Ferreira sort of ran the thing. and no one else saw the 
union. but increasingly line management. training specialists, compensation 
specialists, all sorts are having to mesh and get more involved. There was a 
recognition that it was important that people management was devolving to 
toe the line because the nature of that relationship was changing with the 
move towards more participatory forms of engagement. It became important 
that first line managers had good people management skills and assumed re-
sponsibility for managing people in their areas. So. over the last year. it's been 
a major focus, with the devolution of human resources management to line. 
training intervention, etc" (ibid). 
The Nampak HR Director suggested a similar shift to line managers: 
70 
"We used to have thousands of lawyers here ... and then we decided that legal 









































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
have never found a need for them. We have a retainer for a legal firm for 
about eight months and we have abandoned that as well. So symbolically that 
shift is important, When we decided three-and-a half years ago that Nampak 
was no longer going to be a company of the past, one of the things was to 
abandon legal industrial relations people. , . The industrial relations functions 
generally moved into the camp of the managers that manage plants, the so-
called line managers" (ibid). 
The need to integrate traditional collective bargaining issues into corpo-
rate strategy has now become central: 
"What we are finding is more and more, the whole issue of production and 
human resources is more integrated than it used to be. The newly created 
employee relations department is tasked with picking up issues with the union, 
but within human resources, training, the benefit side. the compensation side 
and then a range of issues on the line side are now involved in industrial and 
employee relations" (VW interview). 
The VWSA HR Director developed this point further: 
"Industrial relations in the old days, involved interacting with the union about 
diSCiplinary issues, conditions of service. pay. overtime - it was limited to that 
sort of thing. We were also involved in a bit of training of artisans and appren-
tices. That was the extent of our work, But today it's a whole host of issues. 
Everything now - out sourcing, strategiC sourcing. where we buy our pans, 
how we structure production. productivity - a host of training issues - mul-
tiskilling, adult basic education - so it's really impossible for one or two indus-
trial relations people to handle those things, Whereas in the old days, one 
person could handle a little bit of training - you know, the old traditional per-
sonnel manager. that's really gone now" (ibid). 
In the words of the Human Resources Director of Randgold: 
"Instead of being second level service departments aimed at record and hous-
ing maintenance, labour allocation, hostel management and employee welfare, 
the human resource departments should be catalysts for cultural change; redes-
ign the labour process; develop strategies for productivity improvements; and 
manage the consequences of the new South Africa" (fnterview: 23 January 
1995). 
It was in the context of these fundamental shifts in the industrial relations 
functions of firms that the "new forums" were initiated by management in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Management, in all cases, seized the 
initiative from the unions and the unions have been perceived as becom-
ing largely reactive in orientation. As the Human Resource Director of 
PG Bison remarked, "Unions have tended to be reactive and Jacking in 
initiative. They lack the capaCity to frame creative and imaginative pro-
posals" (interview: 12 January 1995). 
The HR Director of VWSA expanded on this point: 
"We are moving into territory that's difficult for management to understand. 
Restructuring. out-sourcing - the shop stewards are unsure of themselves a lot 
of the time. for example, Board of Trade and Industries recommendations on 
the future of the motor industry. Quite frankly these guys do not know what 
the hell we are talking about. And a lot of them feel very inadequate and it was 
comfortable in the past. They were masters in the art of resistance politics, 
taking management to the cleaners. whipping up emotions. Now that whole 
ball game has changed, I think they are very unsure. Now they are having to 
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finance director and our controller, who are very bright CNs will come down 
and meet them with figures. And we will talk about duty-free allowances, tar-
iffs, the Fiscus - what all this means for the motor industry and by their own 
admission they just say, guys, look we don't know. We've discussed our sub-
missions to the Board of Trade: they don't understand what we are talking 
about - whether what we say is right or wrong, they're just going to have to 
trust us" ( VWSA interview). 
As the case studies illustrate, forums arise from "breakpoints", understood 
as radical changes in the firms external environment. such as the drop-
ping of tariff barriers in the mowr industry, that radically change business 
conditions. These changes, in turn, intensify conflicts in the workplace, as 
illustrated in Table 2. Interestingly. in all the case studies. management 
responded creatively by introducing new forms of management-union 
interaction. These initiatives changed the rules of the game. In order w do 
so, it is not surprising that a striking feature of the new forums is a strong 
emphasis on consensual interaction. Although most have arrangements 
for third party intervention (mediation or arbitration), they by and large 
attempt to avoid conflict by being consensus driven. This emphasis pre-
vails even if it means Side-stepping or shelving some issues and prioritis-
ing others. It is well captured by a clause in the constitution of one of 
these forums, which states: 
"Consensus will be sought by way of exhaustive discussion by the parties to the 
Working Groups, the National Forum and the Strategic Forum. This can include 
third party facilitation and referral to the next higher level. Should this process 
fail the parties will refer the matter to mediation under the auspices of the In-
dependent Mediation Services of South Africa" (lMSSA) (Constitution of Saman-
cor Participative Structures). 
Given the role that overt conflict has played in all the companies studied, 
the emphasis on consensus is understandable. Moreover, given the high 
rate of unionisation in these companies and the constant presence of the 
union as an agent of bargaining, the parties have an incentive w resolve 
issues within the forums in a consensual manner. 
4.2.2 Whatform do they take? 
The "forums" that emerged in the late eighties and early nineties are 
different from shop steward committees. Shop steward committees 
perform a dual function: they engage in COllective bargaining and partici-
pate in joint problem solving where problems arise in production. The 
forums institutionally separate these two functions and focus on problem 
solving in production and wider poliCY issues, particularly in the area of 
labour relations. Importantly, these forums are linked directly to union 
structures. They extend, rather than transcend, collective bargaining. 
The forums are usually comprised of senior shop stewards drawn from 
the shop steward committees. Only in one of the plants did we find a non-
union member in the forum. Where multi-unionism exists, representation 
is proportional to union membership. The forums are predominantly 
based on union members who are employees in the enterprise, with 
occasional involvement of "external" union officials. In one case, union 










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
Many of the companies have multiple structures operating at different 
levels. At the central level there is a forum that focuses on strategic and 
policy issues. For example, the National Strategic Meeting of Pick 'n Pay; 
the National Forum at South African Breweries; the National and Strategic 
Forum at SAMANCOR; the Central Forum at Nampak; the Joint Union 
Management Executive Committee (JUMEC) at Volkswagen. Sometimes, 
ad hoc working groups are established to investigate specific issues or a 
range of issues, for example, housing loans, affirmative action, training, 
discrimination, employment equity, job security, RDP. These companies 
then have forums that focus on the plant or local level. They will also often 
have regional or divisional forums, for example, the regional forum in 
South African Breweries and Pick 'n Pay. 
Only two companies in our sample have worker representatives on 
their boards of management (Samancor and Eskom). Board representa-
tion, however, was proposed by a third company but turned down by the 
majority union. The relationship between board representation and trade 
unions is ambiguous at present. In the case of Eskom, a union leader sits 
on the board in his official capacity, whereas in Samancor the position of 
the worker representative is contested. According to senior management 
at Samancor, the union representative is a member of the board in his 
"individual capacity" (Interview: MD, Samancor). The representative, 
however, feels he is there as a representative of labour, "I will always 
emphasise that I am from labour and the views I am expressing are from 
a particular stakeholder" (Macun & Buhlungu, 1996: 28). 
4.2.3 What powers do theseforums have? 
One way of measuring the degree of power vested in the "new forums" is 
whether they have statutory rights or written agreements. None of the 
companies sampled had triggered a workplace forum in terms of Chapter 
5 of the LRA, but some had format agreements covering the powers and 
functions of the forums. For example, in the case of VWSA, the forum 
(called the Negotiating Committee) has a written agreement between 
VWSA, Numsa and the SA Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union. This 
agreement prescribes the following role for the Negotiating Committee, 
namely to: 
(a) discuss, negotiate and agree operational issues and other matters of 
plant-wide relevance; 
(b) resolve disputes referred by Business Unit Committees; 
(c) explore means of promoting co-operation and facilitating a two-way 
communication process, for example via sharing of ideas and success 
stories through presentations. 
On the other hand, the constitution governing Samancor's Strategic 
Forum explicitly defines it as a consultative and information sharing 
forum. While the documents give a clear role to the forums, they do not 
clearly define the powers and responsibilities of these bodies. Not all the 
companies have formal agreements governing the forums, however, and 
some use their recognition agreements with the majority union as a 










































the risk of the forums having a limited lifespan and of being sacrificed to 
what are perceived as more urgent priorities when companies enter diffi-
cult economic times. 
Most of the forums are empowered to deal with a range of corporate 
and industrial relations issues, excluding wages. In many of the cases 
investigated, bargaining is centralised either at the national company level 
or in sectoral arrangements, such as the National Bargaining Forum (NBF) 
established for the motor industry. Bargaining over wages and conditions 
of employment is, therefore, formally removed from plant level interac-
tion in forums. Examples of the kind of issues dealt with in the forums 
include productivity and flexibility in working arrangements (such as out 
sourcing), training programmes, affirmative action, racism, RDP projects, 
world-class manufacturing, company financial performance, strategic direc-
tion and benefits such as long-service awards. 
The flow of information within these forums is relatively high and has 
tended to increase over time as the parties have developed their working 
relationships. In some companies, there is still hesitation by management 
when it comes to full disclosure of financial information. This is not en-
tirely surprising as outside the context of the LRA there is no legal obliga-
tion to do so, nor are there any arrangements or agreements concerning 
confidentiality of information within these forums. In the absence of clear 
gUidelines concerning confidentiality. the flow of information is likely to 
remain uneven and, possibly, limited. Unions can ask for information and 
in many cases management make regular presentations to the union or 
forum on the financial position of the company, excluding sensitive infor-
mation on business negotiations and plans. 
A central question raised by these forums is whether they operate on 
the basis of joint decision-making. Although some of the companies do 
have joint-decision making on certain issues, in general this is not the 
case. The picture that emerges is one of consultative representation, where 
workers have gained a substantial degree of influence over a broader 
range of issues. These concern company policy and operations that have 
traditionally been the domain of both parties, such as job security, af-
firmative action and job grading. In some cases, joint decision-making has 
been extended to issues such as out-sourcing and productivity. 
The underlying purpose of the forums can best be summed up in the 
words of one of our informants: 
"to deal with any issues that are obviously not of a collective bargaining nature, 
in a collaborative manner to maximise the impact on the organisation of what 
we want to do" (Human Resource Manager, SAB). 
From this statement, it could be argued that the emerging forums have 
significant powers, but these are ambiguous as they are not institutional-
ised in any formal way and there are no binding mechanisms on the 
parties. What binds them is an interest, on the part of workers, in exercis-
ing greater influence and, on the part of management, in creating greater 
stability, predictability and co-operation. An impliCit rationale for the 
forums is to change the internal politics of the workplace to ensure that 










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? . 
the influence of workers. but stop short of real co-determination. It is 
important to bear in mind that in all the companies there are powerful 
unions which can exercise leverage on management through the collective 
bargaining process. It is this leverage that remains central in the work-
place. notwithstanding the formation of new forums. 
By and large, the companies studied typify what Pateman has character-
ised as partial participation, that is. situations in which two or more parties 
influence each other in making decisions but. in the final instance. power 
rests with one party only. Within this scenario it is not surprising to find a 
strong emphasis on co-operation and consensus. While forums open up 
the potential for union influence to be extended, labour's power remains 
limited within them. 
5 CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS 
There are a number of general points concerning the functioning of the 
forums which give them a particular character and serve to distinguish 
them from international experience of workplace representation. Firstly. 
companies are spending considerable amounts of time and money in 
running and servicing forums. As pointed out above, most of the compa-
nies are large and many have a number of establishments. Given the close 
link between the forums and trade unions, it is often the members of 
national negotiating committees that also attend forum meetings with 
senior management. For example. Pick 'n Pay and Nampak have many 
different workplaces throughout the country and have to fly delegates to 
these regular meetings. Estimates of financial expenditure on works 
councils in countries such as Germany suggest that this amounts to ap-
proximately 1 % of the annual wage bill: It is possible that the costS of the 
forums in the sample companies exceed this. but these should be viewed 
as "start up" costs. which may decrease over time. Costs are clearly also 
related to the question of who participates. More decentralised forms of 
representation. would clearly incur lower costs. 
A second characteristic of the forums that have been established during 
the 1980s and 1990s is their vulnerability. In some cases. such as PG 
Bison, there is a dependence on individuals. the charismatic individual 
manager who initiates a forum and later leaves the company. Stace and 
Dunphy (1994) call this charismatic transformation. The problem that 
arose in PG Bison was that of maintaining commitment when the charis-
matic leader leaves to take up a position in government. The problem 
seemed to have been resolved by an undertaking by the new chief execu-
tive to commit himself to the same transformation process. But the vul-
nerability of the process was underlined when the new chief executive 
abandoned the structure due to a downturn in the company's economiC 
performance. In the absence of statutory support or formal agreements. 
4 Personal communications: Dr Claus Schnabel. Head of Industrial Relations Depart-
ment. Institut der Deutshen. Wirtshaft. Cologne, 13 December 1996 See also: 










































· LAW. DEMOCRACY &DEVELOPMENT 
these experiments in participation will always be subject to cycles of 
changing support by management and labour. 
A third characteristic of forums arises from their close link to union 
structures. Because of this close link, and the structure of trade union 
organisation in South Africa. white-collar workers and middle manage-
ment are excluded from the forums. The only exception in our sample 
was Randgold, where the middle strata were unionised through the Mine 
Surface Officials Association (MSOA). the Underground Officials Associa-
tion and the Surface and Technical Officials Association (STOA)s In all the 
other cases. these middle strata are neither unionised, nor are they in-
cluded in the forums. This places management in a dilemma: do they 
establish a separate forum for this excluded stratum, do they encourage 
this stratum to unionise, or do they wait for the representative union to 
trigger a workplace forum? Mercedes Benz have resolved this dilemma by 
establishing a separate forum for the middle strata "to hear the concerns 
of staff" (interview: HR Director, Mercedes Benz. 2 October 96). The 
incentive for all parties to establish a genuinely representative forum is 
that all parties in the workplace now face the common challenge of inter-
national competition and the need, therefore, to develop more co-
operative relationships. 
In our sample it is clear that, in most cases, a dual structure of bargain-
ing emerged: wage bargaining at the sectoral or central level and bargain-
ing over production at the plant level. Such a structure makes it easier to 
separate wage bargaining from negotiation over in-plant, production re-
lated issues. Employers, however, expressed concern over the rigidity of 
centralised bargaining. Ironically, the dual structure of bargaining holds 
out the real prospect of articulation, that is, increased labour-management 
interaction at several levels.6 This approach, which Labour Minister Tito 
Mboweni calls "regulated flexibility", allows plants to modify agreements 
through a decentralised bargaining structure. 
Two important limitations emerged from the case studies. The first re-
lates to the limited capaCity of forum members to engage in jOint problem 
solving. This can best be illustrated through Randgold's Harmony Mine 
Forum in Virginia. A crucial item on every agenda is the full disclosure of 
the company's performance. Management feel that "slowly a lot more 
understanding is developing between union and managements on the 
financial constraints that the mine is under" (interview: Personnel Man-
ager, Harmony Mine, 1 I May 1995). 
Union representatives saw the forum rather differently. While welcom-
ing the creation of a forum, union representatives complained that deci-
sions made at the forum were never implemented. "It is nothing more 
5 These organisations subsequently merged [0 form the Amalgamated Technical and 
Electronic Association of South Africa. 
6 Recent research has challenged the Simplistic proposition that enhanced international 
competition is producing a general decentralisation of industrial relations. The general 
trend is not [Owards decentralisation. but rather towards articulation. that is. interac-










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
than a talk shop," one representative said. "It has got no teeth. Manage-
ment controls the agenda and uses the forum to lecture to us". Another 
complained that meetings do not take place regularly. "They only call 
meetings when they want to meet with us. When management has a 
problem, then they call a meeting". Another remarked "that 99 % of the 
time management has already made the decision. They do not ask us, 
they tell us. We are a rubber stamp". 
One striking feature of this forum is that the union representatives do 
not feel they have control over its direction. They feel that the agenda is 
drawn up by management, who call the meetings and most importantly. 
the union representatives do not meet separately as a group. In practice. it 
is being run by management. and workers are treating the forum as if it 
were a " liaison committee". 
There are, of course, crucial differences between the Harmony Forum 
and a liaison committee. First, the forum is non-racial. Secondly, there is a 
strong trade union for black workers, the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM). In fact, it was interesting to observe that the NUM was the only 
union in the forum that knew anything about the new LRA and its provi-
sion for workplace forums. This was because the NUM Collective Bargain-
ing Unit had held a seminar on workplace forums shortly before the 
meeting and the NUM representative had attended this seminar. 
This underlines the crucial importance of increasing union members 
capacity to engage in these forums. a responsibility that rests with na-
tional union structures and which will require substantial change in the 
operation of national unions. This is well illustrated by a veteran unionist 
and ex-PPWAWU General Secretary, who said: 
"Most of the union officials came from a polltical background, not from an in-
dustrial background per se. They were politicians. They were political activists 
who happened to be much more articulate in making this or that statement in 
whatever meetings. We were not asking people when interviewing them for 
organisers jobs "what is your experience about the factory situation?" "Can you 
tell us about the process of production in the printing industry?" ... We were 
focusing on political issues. apartheid in the work situation" (Interview with 
S Kubheka, conducted by S Buhlungu, 28 November 1994). 
This limitation places workers at a disadvantage. It is exacerbated by the 
high turnover of union officials and inadequate training of workplace 
representatives. Trade unions in Germany playa pivotal role in supporting 
and resourcing works councils and. as a reSUlt. members of councils are 
well qualified to engage with management. The length of service of many 
works councillors also provides necessary experience in the functioning of 
the councils. 
A second and related limitation concerns the reluctance of employees 
and their representatives to identify with the goals of the enterprise. This 
is deeply rooted in the low trust dynamic that arises from the apartheid 
workplace regime (Von Holdt. forthcoming), and has resulted in suspicion 
of any involvement in decision-making. For example, shop stewards at 
Mercedes Benz SA expressed deep distrust of their works councils' coun-
terparts from Mercedes Benz in Stuttgart. when they visited the South 










































LAW, DEMOCMCY & DEVELOPMENT 
"The gap between shop stewards and the people they represent is very large. 
They (works councillors) dress in suits and ties. They look like managers. They 
are actually involved in running the company. They help make the rules. Here, 
our part-time shop stewards still work on the lines alongside membership" 
(interview conducted by Bridget Kenny, East London, I I july 1997). 
Clearly, these shop stewards saw the role that works councillors play in 
Germany as being in conflict with their role as worker representatives. The 
act of jOint decision-making for the shop stewards meant that the works 
councils had been co-opted by management, not that workers had won 
greater influence over decision-making. The result of this suspicion is that 
worker representatives find themselves in difficult situations when com-
panies engage in cost-cutting exercises. This was clearest in VWSA and 
Mercedes Benz where the shop steward leadership has been overturned 
due to a feeling on the part of the rank and file that the shop stewards 
were being co-opted into managements strategy (Rosenthal. t 996). Fur-
thermore, the practice of tight mandate and accountability leads shop 
stewards [0 either evade tough issues or to agree to tough decisions but 
then refuse to accept responsibility for these decisions when faced by their 
members. A manager captured this tension when he described how shop 
stewards did not want minutes of sensitive discussions made public: 
"They prefer to discuss these things in private because they know that if it gets 
out - that we are discussing the out sourcing of the seat area - then they say: 
"For goodness sake, let's not tell the workers that we are discussing thiS highly 
contentious topiC." And we say, "Shouldn't we go out and tell them upfront?" 
"Woh ... "they say" (interview: VWSA Human Resource Manager, 23 February 
1995). 
The final limitation concerns the unresolved nature of worker representa-
tion at board level. As highlighted above, two companies in our sample 
have worker representatives on their boards. Such representation has, 
however, developed in an ad hoc way and seems to rely on particular 
individuals rather than clear policy in law and on the part of trade unions 
and business. Cosatu's September Commission on the Future of Trade 
Unions has, however, begun to address this. The Commission's report 
suggests that: 
78 
"It should be noted that it would be disastrous for a union to participate on the 
board of a company jf it does not have a clear agenda, and a programme of 
support for its representatives. The union should define its agenda and pro-
gramme jn terms of the goals listed and discussed in S.2.a above. If the unions 
decide to go this route. they should seek to have at least two places on the 
board of directors reserved for worker representatives to ensure some mutual 
support. A single labour director could become isolated. The representatives 
may be union officials or workers from the company concerned. The important 
thing is to maintain strong channels of communication between the labour 
directors and the shop steward structures in the workplace. to ensure co-
ordination between collective bargaining and board discussions and other 
participative forums. Labour directors should not forget that they represent 
workers and must defend their interests. They should always caucus with shop 










































A TREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMTNATION? 
This proposal has met with opposition from some influential affiliates, 
who think it will be in direct conflict with what unions are supposed 
to represent. NUMSA, for example, argue that co-determination with 
the private sector will make workers' interests and agenda similar to that 
of employers. NUMSA says this will make unions co-partiCipants in sensi-
tive deCisions such as retrenchments (Mail & Guardian, 15-21 August, 
1997) 
6 CONCLUSION 
In the process of negotiating workplace change, a number of companies 
have begun to experiment with new institutional forms to deal with the 
challenge of restructuring. Some have done so in more advanced ways 
than others. A key feature of these forums is their attempt to separate 
institutionally collective bargaining from that of joint problem solving over 
production. However, forum members find it extremely difficult to take 
the initiative as they do not have the resources required to intervene in 
the restructuring process. They find it difficult to deal with new issues that 
go beyond collective bargaining, such as team work and productivity, all 
of which could lead to job losses. In fact, both management and shop 
stewards are well schooled in adversarial bargaining and find it difficult to 
adjust to co-determination. Furthermore, these forums are not based on 
legal rights but on the sheer power (or lack of power) of union representa-
tives in the workplace. 
In the past, South African labour law did not provide for adequate 
workplace representation. Instead a tradition was built up which rested on 
strong independent shop-floor structures based around the recognition 
agreement and the shop steward committee. However, in the process of 
experimenting with these new institutional forms, the embryo of what the 
law now calls workplace forums emerged. In doing so, these companies 
have begun to create "breakpOints" which define the playing fields for 
others. This emerges most clearly in the influence these experiments have 
had on the new LRA. However, as our research suggests, both trade 
unions and management remain cautious about existing forums and the 
provision in the Act for workplace forums. 
At the core of the unions caution lies the concern that new forms of 
workplace representation will undermine established union structures. 
Given the adversarial nature of workplace industrial relations, suspicion of 
any form of involvement and taking responsibility for decisions persists 
amongst employees and unionists. Managements' uncertainty, especially 
with regard to the statutory forums, arises from their fear that the pro-
posed forums will substantially curtail their prerogative to make unilateral 
decisions by giving workers statutory rights to consultation and co-
decision-making. These reservations have been bolstered by recent em-
ployer arguments that the German model of co-determination is ex-
hausted and that its labour market is too rigid and inflexible (Mail & 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Comparative research has. however. concluded that institutions such as 
workplace forums offer a secure basis on which to construct an effective 
partnership with employees at plant level. Moreover. they hold out the 
prospect for enhancing efficiency by improving the operation of firms. 
Current research on the effect of co-determination on European managers 
supports this argument. Rogers and Streeck argue that representative 
consultation contributes to economic performance by improving the flow 
of information; facilitating the implementation of decisions; reducing ab-
senteeism; helping to handle worker grievances; and helping firms to move 
towards a more flexible and decentralised organisation of work (Rogers & 
Streeck. op cit). Indeed. from our own research. it emerged that from being 
the Cinderella of German industrial relations in the early post-war period. 
co-determination has moved to its current status as the cornerstone of the 
system (Webster & Macun. Business Day. 19 February 1997). 
Comparative research also suggests that workplace forums could streng-
then unions (Streeck. 1984). Firstly. workplace forums exercise their rights 
as unitary bodies on behalf of the workforce as a whole. Thus forums can 
become the "extended arm" of the union and deepen its organisational 
penetration of the workforce in occupational groupings that are less 
susceptible to unionisation. Given the current low level of unionisation of 
middle Strata employees by the majority unions in South Africa. forums 
could arguably offer the same opportunity to unions as they have in other 
countries. Secondly. the union can strengthen itself by gaining access to 
information from its members on the forum. The forums also offer unions 
the opportunity to increase their capaCity through training, paid time-off. 
full-time representatives and administrative facilities. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that forums will not lead to a decline of 
unions in the plant. A central criticism of works councils in Europe is their 
tendency to become management oriented, concerned too much with 
promoting management's definition of the enterprise. Indeed, those 
located within the British labour tradition, such as our own labour move-
ment. may argue that it is collective bargaining, and not co-determination, 
that provides the key to industrial democracy (Clegg, \951). One way of 
meeting union concerns that forums could undermine union structures in 
the workplace would be to link forum members directly to the union. This 
is provided for in the Act. 
Through the introduction of workplace forums in the new LRA, South 
Africa has made a tentative step towards co-determination. However, the 
Act falls short in not making adequate provision for training of members 
of workplace forums. 
An important challenge facing trade unions in South African plants is 
how they interact with workplace forums, once triggered. Ideally, a close 
and constructive relationship should be crafted between the union and the 
forum. The Act also makes no mention of board level repreSentation. The 
significance of this lies not only in increasing the influence of employees 
but. more importantly. in widening management's notion of their re-
sponsibility beyond shareholders to all stakeholders (Albert, 1992). Whe-
ther Chapter 5 of the Labour Relations Act has the potential to take us in 










































A tREND TOWARDS CO-DETERMINATION? 
Appendix 1 
Sample classification 
Company Sector Markets Degree of Compe-
tition 
AECI Manufacturing Domestic & lmerna- Very high 
tional 
Eskom Electricity Domestic & Regional Low 
Mercedes Manufacturing Domestic & Imerna- High 
tional 
Nampak Manufacturing Domestic & I merna- Growing 
tional 
P G Bison Manufacturing Domestic & Imerna- High 
tional 
Pick & Pay Retail Domestic Low 
Rand Gold Mining International High 
Transnet Transport Domestic Low (except road 
transport - High) 
SAB Manufacturing Domestic & Imerna- Low 
tional 
Samancor Mining Domestic & lnterna- High 
tional 











































I LAw: DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT· ..• 
Appendix 2 
Industrial relations characteristics of sample 
Company Trade union density no of trade unions Affiliation of 
majority union 
AECI 94% SACWU NETU MWU NACTU 
EWU CWIU Staff Asso-
ciation 
Eskom 67% NUM NUMSA MWU COSATU 
SAAWU Eskom Em-
ployees Association 
Mercedes 80% NUMSA COSATU 
Nampak 65% NUMSA PPWAWU MWU COSATU 
P G Bison 90 % of bargaining PPWAWU NUMSA COSATU 
unit UWUSA SAA WU in Piet 
Retief Other smaller 
unions 
Pick & Pay 42 % of bargaining SACCAWU COSATU 
unit (66 % if casuals 
excluded) 
Randgold 87% NUM Amalgamated COSATU 
Technical & Electrical 
Assoc of SA 
Transnet 60% SARHWU SALSTAFF COSATU 
BLATU 
SAB FAWU 57% total & FA WU Food & Beverage COSATU 
80 % weekly paid Workers Union 
Food & Bev minimal 
Samancor 85% NUM NUMSA NETU COSATU 
Yster & Staal 
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Interview I 1 : 





Jim Smith PG Bison 12 January t 995 
Frans van der Walt Pick 'n Pay t 6 January 1995 
Richard Davies SA Breweries 19 January 1995 
Richard de Villiers Randgold 23 January t 995 
Bob Macilwaine Eskom 25 January 1995 
Neil Cummings Nampak 26 January 1995 
Anthony Ewart PX Group 26 January 1995 
Bokkie Botha AECI 31 January t 995 
Moss Ngosheng Gencor 10 February 1995 
Andre de Wet Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council, 
30 January 1995 
Brian Smith and Judy Parfitt Volkswagen 15 February 1995 
VOlkswagen Shop Stewards Committee 15 February 1995 
Brian Knoesen Mercedes-Benz 14 February 1995 
Sipho Kubheka PPW A WU Head Office 28 November 1994 
Joseph Mdluli PG Bison shop steward 20 June 1994. 
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